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Adelson v. Harris, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 67 (Sept. 27, 2017) (en banc)1 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE;  
ANTI-SLAPP APPLICABILITY 
 
Summary 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court (en banc) held that (1) a hyperlink to source material 
concerning a judicial proceeding may qualify as a report within the common law fair report 
privilege; and (2) Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute, as effective prior to the 2013 amendment, reaches 
communication “aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action,” even if it is not 
addressed to a government agency. 
 
Background 
 
In 2012, the Nevada Jewish Defense Counsel (NJDC) published an online petition asking 
then-candidate for U.S. President, Mitt Romney, to reject financial contributions from casino-
owner Nathan Adelson. The petition states that Adelson supported and approved of prostitution 
taking place at a casino he owns in Macau, China. Specifically, the petition included a hyperlink 
to an article published by the Associated Press (AP), which discussed ongoing litigation in Nevada. 
The AP article summarizes an affidavit signed by a former CEO of Adelson’s casinos in Macau, 
and quotes that a “prostitution strategy had been approved by Adelson.” 
Adelson sued the NJDC, and its CEO David Harris, in the Southern District of New York, 
alleging defamation. The District Court, after concluding that Nevada law applied, dismissed 
Adelson’s complaint, reasoning that the prostitution comment was a report of judicial proceedings 
and therefore merited protection by Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute. Adelson appealed to the Second 
Circuit, which certified two questions of law to the Nevada Supreme Court. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Predicated on the belief that “Nevada citizens have a right to know what transpires in public 
and official legal proceedings,”2 the Court reiterated that Nevada “has long recognized a special 
privilege of absolute immunity from defamation given to the news media and general public to 
report newsworthy events in judicial proceedings.”3 The Court refers to this immunity by its 
commonly used name: fair report privilege.  
 Fair report privilege, the court emphasized, extends to media and non-media defendants 
equally, so long as that person “makes a republication of a judicial proceeding from material that 
is available to the general public.”4 The immunity flowing from fair report privilege is absolute—
“preclud[ing] liability even if the defamatory statements are published with knowledge of their 
falsity and personal ill will toward the plaintiff.”5 
 
                                                        
1  By David E. Chavez. 
2  Lubin v. Kunin, 117 Nev. 107, 114, 17 P.3d 422, 427 (2001) (internal quotation omitted). 
3  Sahara Gaming Corp. v. Culinary Workers Union Local 226, 115 Nev. 212, 214, 984 P.2d 164, 166 (1999). 
4  Id. at 215, 984 P.2d at 166.  
5  Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56, 60, 657 P.2d 101, 104 (1983). 
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Determining when a document, which draws upon a source summarizing judicial proceedings, 
falls within the fair report privilege 
 
 The court adopted the Dameron test, which extends fair report privilege to a document 
drawing upon a source summarizing judicial proceedings if the source’s specific attribution, or its 
overall context, allows an average reader to determine that the article “is quoting, paraphrasing, or 
otherwise drawing upon official documents or proceedings.”6 
 
The hyperlink provides sufficient attribution to turn the petition into a privileged fair report 
 
 Noting that Adelson concedes that the underlying AP article is itself protected by fair report 
privilege, the Court must only determine whether the hyperlink in the petition attributes 
sufficiently to avail itself to fair report privilege. The Court states that the test is whether “a specific 
attribution makes it apparent to an average reader that a document draws from judicial 
proceedings[.]” 
 The Court explains that hyperlinks are prevalent online, permit direct access to a source, 
and are easy to use. A click on a hyperlink, the Court finds, can enable a reader to instantly 
determine whether the underlying source is drawing from judicial proceedings. 
 However, the Court warns that the utility of a hyperlink as an attributive device is lost if 
the average reader cannot identify, open, or understand its importance. To come within the reach 
of fair report privilege, a hyperlink must be sufficiently conspicuous. 
 
Conspicuousness and textual explanation 
  
 The hyperlink in the petition was sufficiently conspicuous. In this case, the hyperlink, 
although not conspicuous in a general sense, was placed in the same sentence as the assertion it 
supported. Thus, the hyperlink’s footnote-like quality, the Court explained, rendered it sufficiently 
conspicuous of supporting the incendiary comments. Additionally, the particular sentence 
containing the easily-accessible hyperlink was written in a way to notify readers that the sentence 
was drawing from other sources. These qualities made the hyperlink sufficiently attributable to 
come within the protection of Nevada’s fair report privilege. 
 
Nevada’s anti-SLAPP protections include speech that seeks to influence an election but is not 
addressed to a government agency 
 
 For the second question, the Court directs attention to the recently-decided Delucchi v. 
Songer7 case. There, the Court determined that the legislative history of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP 
statute evinces that, before and after the 2013 amendment, the statute did and continues to cover 
speech made in furtherance of inducing a government or electoral outcome, notwithstanding 
whether it was aimed at a government agency.8 However, said speech must be either “truthful or 
[] made without knowledge of its falsehood”9; the Court declined to address whether this was the 
case with the petition.  
                                                        
6  Dameron v. Wash Magaine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
7  133 Nev. Adv. Op. 42, 396 P.3d 826 830 (2017). 
8  Id. 
9  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.637(1) (1997); see Deluchi v. Songer, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 42, 396 P.3d 826 (2017). 
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Conclusion 
 
The hyperlink’s footnote-like quality renders it sufficiently conspicuous to put an average 
reader on notice that the petition is drawing from another source summarizing a judicial 
proceeding. Thus, the petition is immune from civil liability under Nevada’s fair report privilege. 
Additionally, the anti-SLAPP statute, prior to its 2003 amendment, did indeed cover the NJDC 
petition insofar as it sought to influence governmental elections or actions without directly 
addressing a government entity. 
